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AiiuiilsofLconoiu' and Social Afasurenie'nt 5/2,
Ot1 IMAL MACROECON,l()Mlç ('()NTlXM.POLICIFS5
BY RO(;IR CRAINF, AWI'} fUR FIAVI NNIR ANt) PFI'H< 'IINSIF yi'
The paper conta las a [ornuil exarni?ia tOniofoptimal polk'v s('quences that minimizea fourteen -qitarte,
objective function subject to the cinrs(ra,,aofa inedijun-sizeil :unili,iear modelofthe (iS.t'COflOfli\' ill order to find whether rl;e optnwl policyofthe period (197 -I' I 974-Il) tliJJered importaiitiv from the
historical pltcy, ejeriunided tin usual fiscal-'nonetar' coordination, required multiple jilStrlIpu,ents for
effectiveness, depended on small1101i?i,5' nuances, and tended toward the steady-state optimum. Wearzue that ni retrospect policy should101ccbeen initially mart' expamu Ice, with slraigluiforward nwne'tars'-Jivi'a!
coordination necessany onlyfolessen the load on each individual instrument, althoughtiming hecanit'
critical whefl only ;nonelary policy was used, 11u'solutja,idid not tend tmm'ard i/ic sfemid'' -state optimum
short-run losses always heavily oulim'eighedinure thstant gains.
1.IN'l'ROD(J(tION
In this paper we present macroeconomic policySequences that minimize a
multiperiod loss function subject to the constraintof a medium-sized nonlinear
econometric model of the U.S. economy. 'Three control solutionsare examined in
an attempt to answer the following questions: (1) Could policy havebeen much
improved? (2) Are there significant gains frommonetary and fiscal policy coor-
dination? (3) Is money alone an effective instrument? (4)I-low important are
timing nuances in the overall solution? and (5) Willoptimal adjustment over a
long planning horizon (3 yeats) approacha steady-state policy?
Thei'e have been few attempts touse formal optimization techniques on
large-scale nonlinear economic models to analyze multiperiodpolicy questions.
In fact, many economists view optimizationas not feasible, as demonstrated by
Shupp's statement regarding the FRB-MIT andBrookings-SSRC models:2 "The
size and complexity of these models preclude formaloptimization ......Recently,
Fair and Holbrook have demonstrated the feasibilityof using open loop tech-
niques to solve these computationally (lifficult problems.tIn this paper we use a
variant of the algorithm described by Holbrookto obtain the optimal solutions.
11. So.tj'rtorts
A Loss Function
The welfare measure includes fourtargets as ultimate goals. The primary
ones are the unemployment rate, ULU, and the inflation rate, YtOtraditional
'the views expressed herein arc soicly those of the authors and donot necessarily represent the
views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
t James Berry not only performed the overwhelmingprogramming task, but also gave invaluable
assistance in improving the method of the solution algorithm.
Palash provides an exception.
- Shupp, p.94.
The Fair and Holbrook articles concentrated on the algorithms andnot the explicit solutions
they produced. For example, Holbrook 11975],p. 4!, says "This exercise uses instruments, targets.
and loss function coefficients of my own choosing, and is designedsolely to illustrate the use of the
optimization techntque."
The price index is for nonfarni business output. This is almost totalt%'endogenously determined
It is closely related to the GNP deflator which includes agricultural pricesnot cxp!aincd by the model
we used.
191macroeconomic goals in which full employment is weighed against excess demand
and inflation. The two secondary goals are the rate of change of inflation,i, and
the rate of change in the Treasury bill rate, RTB. ji is motivated by theargument
that contracts could be written in real terms if the inflation rate were known, but
that a variable inflation rate creates uncertainty which retards adjustmentand
increases the social loss. Similarly, interest rate fluctuations are believed tocreate
uncertainty in financial markets.
The actual loss function is a compromise between the acceleration istPosition
of stabilizing the inflation rate and the announced goal of the period,reducing
inflation. Unemployment is weighted twice as heavily as inflation.Fluctuations in
the Treasury bill rate receive a relative weight of 0.1. Finally, a penalty isattached
to the cross product i' to encourage reduction of inflation.
The quadratic form
14
(1) L1=>[2.0 ULU'+l.O(+O.1 j+O.l RIB].
gives the loss on the target variables.
The desired paths of all the targets are zero, a virtuallyunattainable goal for
both inflation and unemployment. In the shortrun the nonlinear Phillipscurve
makes the desired zero paths impossible for bath inflationand unemployment
simultaneously, while in the long run the Phillipscurve is vertical at the "natural"
rate of unemployment (4.8 percent in the modelwe chose). Since the targetsare
unattainable the loss function is effectively asymmetricand avoids the problem of
penalizing negative inflation or unemploymentrates.
A monetary and a fiscal instrumentnominalM1 and deflatedgovernment
expenditureswere selected as controllable by thepolicymakers, and quadratic
instrument costs based on deviations ofthe instruments from their desiredlevels were imposed:
=) A1(G - G*)+A2(M_M*)2
The total loss is the sum of thetwo components
(1.2) L=L1+L2.
Three control solutionsare examined, differing in the instrumentsavailable to the policymaker and thecost imposed on instrument paths deviatingfrom their desired settings. The tablebelow gives the instrumentparameter values in the loss function for the threeruns.
TABLE I
INSTRUMENT Loss FUNCTIONPARAMETER VALUES IN ALTERNATIVESOLUTIONS
Solution A1 G* M* Notes
0.001Historical II 0.005 0.00561.8548(I.056)1"'4JM0 III 0 0 61854B(i.056)t"]M0
192
Only one instrument, M
G* is the 1970-tv value
No instrument costsSolution I uses only one instrument(Al) with a very light cost, solutionII tests a
coordinated policy with light instrumentcosts, and solution III is basedon
completely unrestricted instrumentmovements. In every case the desired path
M" is 5.6 percent growth fromthe 197 1-1 money base (M0) of226.94B. A 5-6
percent money growth rate seems to beconsistent with the announced policies of
the period; however, thepolicies were not specified interms of monetary
aggregates until 1974, Desired realgovernment spending was set at a constant,
the 1970-IV value.
The planning horizon is the 3year historical period beginning in the first
quarter of 1971 and running through thesecond quarter of 1974. This isa volatile
period starting at the trough ofa recession. The historical recoverywas hampered
by large exogenous shocks includingmajor increases in agricultural goodsprices
and the price of oil, anda rapidly increasing aggregate inflation rate.
MINNIE,5 a condensed (21stochastic equations, 40 identities) versionof the
SSRC-MIT-Penn quarterly econometric model,was used as a deterministic
description of the economy. Simulationsover the period were based on actual
values of the exogenous variables;no residuals were used to improve the tracking
performance of the model. The effect of thewage/price freeze also has been
omitted since it is a seldom used policy tool.As a result, the simulated-historical
endogenous variables do not duplicate theactual-historical values. The solutions
presented are valid within the contextof the model, and represent policy
alternatives to wage/price controls.
B. Solution IMonetary Policy Alone
In recent years policymakers have begunto rely more heavily on monetary
policy as the stabilization tool. In solutionI, monetary policy is the only control
and government spending is set at its historicalpath which showed a slight decline
over the period. The optimal policy is labeled Al inFigure 1 and Table 2.
Although the optimal policy isnot especially volatilethere areno signifi-
cant single quarter switchbacks-_-it doesmove decisively in the first three quarters
to offset the recession inherent in the initialconditions. Using the minimum target
loss as a base (L1), the historical policyresults in a 15 percent increase in L1 from
the control solution (from 972 to 1115).
Since unemployment lies systematicallybelow the historical values (the
average for the control solution is 4.37 percentversus 5.49 percent for history)
and inflation systematically above (thecontrol solution average is 5.21percent
versus 4.29 percent historical), it seems likely that thepolicymaker's loss function
differed significantly from ours.6 Nevertheless, thehistorical money stock is within
6 percent of the control solutionmoney stock in every quarter except for the early
recovery quarters 197 1-1 and 1!, and it is within 1percent of the historical stock
for all of 1972. Thus relatively small changesin the timing and magnitude of the
control can have significant effectson the policy loss function.
3MINNIE collapses severalsectors of the large model to aggregate measures (number of
endogenous variables drops from 187 to 61) but replicatesthe medium term (3 to 4 years) dynamic
properties of the full model. See Battenberg, Enzler, and 1-lavenner.
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In order to isolate the gainsfrom the optimal timing of policy We have
simulated a policy that has the same average moneystock over the period as the
true optimum but isgenerated by a constant money growth rate from the 19]0-lV
initial condition.7 This solution islabeled "Average Optimal" in Figure 1 and
Table 2. Even a cursory examinationshows that this policy is inferior to the
optimal policy, or even history, and it isfurther evident that it has left the economy
in a poor final position (the last three quartersaccount for 15 percent of the loss of
1626). The gains from the correct timing ofpolicy, in this case the rapid initial
money increase, are verylarge. This is especially interesting since policies of
gradual reentry are often proposed as amethod of smoothing anomalous system
dynamics even when it is recognized that pastpolicies have resulted in a money
base that is lower than the desired base. Asthe average optimal solution
demonstrates, these cautious solutions may be extremely costly to the economy.5
C. Solution tIcoordinated Monetary andFiscal Policy
Solution II is designed to determine whether a second active instrument
significantly increases welfare, and whether close coordination of monetary and
fiscal policy is important. This time the algorithm converged to a minimum target
loss of 943. The instrument values given in Figure 2 and Table 3 show that
government expenditures are used almost exclusively to offset the initial condi-
tions (because the associated multipliers are larger in the beginning periods and
better behaved than the money multipliers). Here monetary policy is used to set
the level of economic activity and fiscal policy is the short term adjusting tool.
After the first two quarters the policy is very smooth; although the additional
instrument does not reduce the target loss appreciably (from 972 with Malone to
943 with M and G), it does reduce the burden on each instrument so that they can
each follow regular patterns. Average government spending for the period is 12
percent above the historical level and the average money stock is within 2 percent
of the average historical stock. Even the initially large government expenditures
($96B) are in the range of historical experience.
The smoothness of the instrument paths is even more apparent when the
average optimal9 solution, isolating the gain from optimal timing, is considered.
This time, with two values to set to their means, the loss is only 7.6 percent higher
than the minimum loss solution. If policymakers allow only small instrument
movements, the gains from an additional instrument may be striking. Further,
since there are no surprises in the direction the instruments should be changed
the dynamic multipliers are regular, with no spikescoordination is nota difficult
problem, implying that an independent agency charged with fiscal stabilization
could have important benefits given that both monetary and fiscal policyare used
cautiously. However, if policy is active there areno great improvements from two
In this case the rate is 9.4 percent per year.
We also searched for the constant growth rate which minimized the loss function. The optimal"
constant M1 growth rate was 8.4 percent. much higher thanany proponents of a constant rate
suggested. Growth rates in the 3-5 percent range produced abysmal losses.
Government expenditures are set to the mean of thetrue optimum, $66.6 I B; money grows at a
constant 8.3 percent per year from its 1970-tv base to yielda meati again equal to that of the true
optimum. -
19640IIIIi i_I_iij_...__1___i
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coordinated instrumentsthey tend to be substitutes for each other (to the extent
that either is effective) and the loss of one instrument can be compensated for by
an aggressive policy with the other.
D. Solution 111Unrestricted Movement of Both M and G
Most of the costs imposed on the instruments do not represent real economic
costs1° but should instead be viewed as a mechanism that keeps the instruments in
politically feasible bounds and the model close to the range where the functional
forms were estimated.
The following solution turns the algorithm loose to find out how well an
aggressive policy sequence might do. The loss function bottomed at 749, a
significant decline from the targets only loss of 972 in solution I and 943 in
solution II. As Figure 3 and Table 4 show, while the instrument means are
plausible, the timing is imaginative."
It is reasonable to question the validity of a solution like this; it clearly is not a
strategy that could be seriously considered. There are some interesting things to
he learned from it, however. For one thing, the unemployment average of 3.5
percent and the inflation average of 3.6 percent are much better than history. As a
result, this policy dominates the historical policy for any quadratic loss function
with the same primary targets and desired target paths.
Even given the unusual instrument paths, one wonders how the control did so
well. MINNIE's Phillips curve includes a term that relates the percentage change
in wages negatively to the percentage change in unemployment. As Figure 3
shows, one quarter of high inflation (each time) is suffered so that unemployment
can be virtually zero, followed by a large increase. The resulting negative effect on
wages and thus prices more than offsets the unemployment los3es, and the policy
ratchets back the Phillips curve.'2 In this particular case the initial position of the
economy is so bad that the required instrument, changes are prohibitively
abrupt,'3 but the principle remains valid: even in models with long lags and
smooth multipliers, decisive carefully timed policies can have high returns.
Another lesson from solution Illis that the minimum loss cannot be
approached by simply increasing the magnitude of the instrument settings from a
cautious policy (like solution 11). The direction of the 28 element control vector (G
and M for 14 periods) is completely different in the two solutions. Taking the
desired instrument paths as the origin, the angle (in 28 space) between the control
vectors for solution II and solution 111 is 116°. Thus cautious policies do not even
lie in the same general direction as aggressive policies, and the acceptable level of
instrument movement significantly conditions the policy.
'°Government purchase of goods cannot be rapidly altered: however, the timing of expenditures
for goods might be easily altered.
Since government expenditures are negative in two quarters, we have implicitly assumed that
the tax multipliers are the negative of the expenditure multipliers. We believe that switching to the tax
multipliers would not change the general conclusions of this purely illustrative exercise.
The effect is model specific.
Once the system has been allowed to move so far from the optimal path the burden of control
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An interesting implication ofthis solution is that an active Policy may do
better than a constant policy evenif the model is in the neighborhoo(I ofa
steady-state equilibrium. MINNIE'slong run Phillips curve is vertical at a natural
rate of unemployment of4.8 percent which implies in the steady state a constant ''s inflation rate 2.6 percent less thanthe money growth rate. 111CC governme
expenditures are neutral in the long run(determining only the public/private
allocation of output and not the quantityproduced), the optimal steady-state
policy consists of setting G to itsdesired path and minimizing the portion of the
steady-state loss function (t.,) that varieswith monetary policy:'5
(5) L,,=(4.8)2+ l.O(,ii 2.6)2-fO.005(ni _S.6)2,
where iz is the annual growth rate of the money stock. In this case the steady-state
optimum is th = 2.61 percent.
Unfortunately or not, the actions of stabilizing authorities demonstrate that
they are unwilling to incur large losses over anything like31years to approach the
steady-state optimum. Since none of the solutions left the economy in the
neighborhood of the long-term solution, we conclude that (if a constant policy is
the goal) there will always be a conflict of short run adjustment considerations
versus long run equilibrium paths. This tradeoff can be resolved by building it into
the loss functionfor example, by making the desired paths the long run
equilibrium pathsbut unless major inportance is attached to the Constancy of
policy this may not he the best strategy. That is, it is not necessarily true that the
optimum long run policy is the one that minimizes the steady-state loss function.
Solution III has significantly bettered the steady-state optimum, and appears
capable of continuously doing so. It is an implausible solutionbecause it is
working from difficult initial conditions using a very small leverbut the long
term policyrnaker has the option of legislating certain nonlinearities to aid in the
task.16 Thus the optimal long term policy may dominate a steady-state policy by
cycling between points on short term Phillips curves.
Conclusions
We conclude, conditional on MINNIE being an adequate representation of
the economy, that between 1971-I and 1974-1! economic policy could have been
improved by being initially much more expansive to offset the 1970 recession.
Either the monetary or fiscal instrument could have been used sinceover the31
year period they appear to be broad substitutes, but if the policymakers favored
minimal instrument changes a relatively straightforward combination of policies
(no exceptional coordination necessary) would have met the needs, If monetary
policy had been the sole stabilizer it could have performed almostas well as the
joint policy but the timing becomes critical and the required changes become large
enough to dismay those charged with the responsibility. Finally,even though 3
years represents a long planning horizon by current standards the control did not
'ln the steady-stateand RTB are identically zero.
Given that the exogenous ariables are growingat the appropriate steady-state values. 16
Though admittedly the formation of exUectatjons would haveto be treated very carefully.
202tend to a steady-state optimum, and the costs of approaching the steady state arc
very high. However, in this model at least. the steady-state policy is unlikely to be
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